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Abstract 
This study examine the linkage between board structure characteristics and corporate financial performance in a 
developing market, East African stock markets. To achieve the objective of this study, we used a strongly 
balanced panel dataset of 240 observations including 30 non-financial listed firms in East African region 
covering the period from 2006-2013 (8 years period). Measures for corporate financial performance employed 
were return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as dependent variables for econometric Model 1 and 
Model 2 respectively and explanatory (independent) variables for board structure characteristics were board size 
(BS), number of non-executive directors (NED), CEO duality (CD) and board and managerial shareholdings 
(BMS).furthermore, the effects of control variable such as firm size (SIZ) has been also examined. The panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and random effects (RE) regression models were employed for Model 1-ROA 
and Model 2-ROE respectively to analyze the data. Our results indicate a statistically significant positive effects 
of board size (BS), number of non-executive directors (NED) and CEO duality (CD) on East African listed 
firm’s financial performance while board and managerial shareholding (BMS) has a statistically significant 
negative effects on East African listed firm’s financial performance at 5% significance level. Finally, the study 
recommends East African listed firm’s to adopt a larger size of board of directors , large proportion of non-
executive directors in the board, CEO-Chair position in their organization structure and a small portion of board 
and managerial shareholding on their ownership structure in order to improve their financial performance, but 
also securities markets regulatory authorities in East African region such as East African member states 
securities regulatory authority (EASRA) and their respective countries securities markets regulatory authorities 
to stimulates new efforts towards better corporate governance practices especially board structure characteristics 
due to its statistically significant effects on companies financial performance and future research can be extended 
after considering other board structure characteristics which were not included in this study like board meeting, 
board attendance, biography of board members and existence of the position of chief financial officer (CFO) in 
board of directors (BOD). 
Keywords: Board Structure Characteristics, Corporate Financial Performance, Panel Data, Developing 
Economies, East African Stock Markets. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Board of Directors (BOD) is charged with oversight of firm management on behalf of shareholders. In 
general terms, the board of directors must assume an effective oversight function so as to protect the interest of 
firm shareholders (Priya and Nimalathasan, 2013). The Board of directors is one of the key significant element 
of corporate governance. During the past decade there has been an increasing awareness of corporate governance 
practices issues in East African region, therefore it become mandatory for firms operating in the region to 
comply with corporate governance principles. 
Corporate governance (CG) has become one of the hot and most debated topic in business 
administration due to accounting manipulation’s and collapse of some big listed public firms like Enron, 
WorldCom, and Parmalat etc. There is ongoing reform process on corporate governance practices after financial 
crisis, therefore sound corporate governance practices such as board characteristics are foundation upon which 
investors and lenders trust are built (Agyei and Owusu, 2014)  
However, until to date the effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance 
is still questionable, and this is due to the fact that academician and researchers are not speaking the same 
language as the effects of board characteristics on corporate financial performance is concern. Their results from 
empirical studies are still contradictory and mixed. Some researchers and academician documented positive 
effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance, other researchers documented 
negative effects while the rest researchers and academician said there is no any significant effects between board 
structure characteristics and corporate financial performance. Therefore, the effects of board structure 
characteristics on corporate financial performance is still a puzzle.  
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The objective of this paper is to explore the effects of board structure characteristics on corporate 
financial performance in East African stock markets context. This study will add value to the body of knowledge 
in both accounting and finance literature especially in developing economies like East African region. To the 
best of my knowledge there is no any empirical evidence about the effects of board structure characteristics on 
corporate financial performance for East African region context and this paper is the first to consider the 
influential effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance in the East African stock 
markets context, this paper consider East Africa region due to the several reasons such as (i) To fill the research 
gap in existing accounting and finance literatures relating to board structure characteristics and corporate 
financial performance due to the reason that, there is no any empirical research as to date on East African region 
while the region is recently experiencing a rapid stock market developments. (ii) To help shareholders of firms in 
East African region to make appropriate decisions regarding board of directors structure characteristics {iii} To 
help Securities markets regulatory authorities in East African region such as East African member states 
securities regulatory authority (EASRA) and their respective country members authorities (like CMSA in 
Tanzania, CMA in Kenya and CMA in Uganda) to formulate policies relating to corporate governance practices 
especially board of directors  characteristics sub-index.{iv}The results of this study will therefore, provide a 
platform for future research in board structure characteristics and corporate financial performance especially for 
East African region and developing economies in general. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents relevant literatures review and research 
hypotheses, Section 3 is about research methodology applied in this study, Section 4 presents study results and 
discussion and lastly Section 5 concludes the paper and give out recommendations. 
 
2. Relevant Literatures Review and Research Hypotheses 
2.1 Theoretical Perspective  
The influence of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance might be related to some 
dominants theories. This study will limit its discussion on the most three {3} dominant theories such as Agency 
theory, Stewardship theory and Resource Dependence theory. 
2.1.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory originally focused on the relationship between owners (principal) and managers (agents), from 
this relationship there will be a conflict of interest between owners (principals) and managers (agents).Managers 
must work for the best interest of owners but manages must be monitored and institutional arrangements must 
provide some checks and balances for assurance that managers (agents) do not misuse their power (Bushra and 
Mishra, 2014).All resulting costs from managers(agents) misusing their power plus all costs of monitoring and 
disciplining them so as to prevent misuse of power are knows as agency cost (Blair,1996). A good corporate 
governance practices like board structure will minimize agency cost. 
2.1.2 Stewardship Theory 
The idea under the stewardship theory is managerial motivation alternative to agency theory. This theory argues 
that shareholders interest are maximized by shared incumbency of these roles. The idea of management team is 
to perform a very good job, to be a good steward of the company’s assets (Donaldson, 1990).Ideally, the good 
stewards are those work towards owner’s interests with assurance of high profits margin and high shareholder’s 
return (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) 
Stewardship theory is totally different from agency theory with regards to the motive of management, 
generally under stewardship theory there is no conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and this is 
due to the fact that, managers who are good stewards of the firm, decides to work with their best effort on behalf 
of shareholders. 
2.1.3 Resources- Dependence Theory  
According to this theory, board of directors are the key persons for providing access to all required resources 
needed by the firm. This theory explained about organizational strategies in aspects like board members structure, 
production strategies and external relations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Board of directors are the ones who 
link between the firm and its external stakeholders. The Board of directors’ ability to provide resources to the 
firm will depends much on board size and board composition (Bodaghi and Ahmadpour, 2010). 
Furthermore, according to (Pleffer and Salancik,1978) directors usually brings four (4) benefits to the 
firm such as information either counsel and advices, access of information that link between the firm and 
environmental contingencies , resources accessibility and legitimacy (Ngan,2013).  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidences relating to the relationship between Board Structure Characteristics and Corporate 
Financial Performance 
The effects of board structure characteristics (board size, board independence, CEO duality, board committee 
and board and managerial shareholding) on corporate financial performance is a very controversial issue in 
academic literatures. Prior empirical studies which mainly focused on developed and emerging economies with 
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very few in developing economies suggested different results that make this topic to be a researchable one in 
finance literature especially in developing economies like East African stock markets. 
2.2.1: Board Size and Corporate Financial Performance 
The board of directors’ core function is to manage the overall company including its operations. The relationship 
between board size of the firm and financial performance is still questionable. There are number of prior 
researches which provide an empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between board size and 
financial performances like Wen et al., (2002) who found a positive relationship for Chinese listed firms, Abor 
(2007) for Ghanaian listed firms, the possible reason which support their positive relationship is a view that, 
larger boards are better for firm financial performance because they have a range of expertise in terms of skills, 
knowledge and experience to help make better decisions and also they are harder for management including a 
powerful CEO to dominate. On the other hand, other researchers found a significant negative relationship 
between board size and financial performance like Jensen (1993) and the possible reason toward their negative 
relationship is the fact that larger boards are less effective, so it’s not easy to co-ordinate, hence encourages free 
riding and poses a lot of problem. Others researches found no relationship at all between board size and firm 
financial performance like Kaymak and Baktas (2008). 
H1: There is a positive statistically significant effects of board size on corporate financial performance 
2.2.2: Non-Executive Directors and Corporate Financial Performance  
Number of non-executive directors in the board of directors is a good measure for board independence, this is 
due to the fact that non-executive directors are not part of management team, and hence there decisions will not 
be influenced by management team. Several researchers provides a positive relationship between non-executive 
directors and corporate financial performance like Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) and Arosa et al., (2010) and their 
possible reason is the fact that, existence of non-executive directors in the board will be an effective monitoring 
of management team functions. On the other hand, other researchers found a negative influence of non-executive 
directors on corporate financial performance such as Erickson et al., (2005) and the possible reason for this is 
due to the fact that non-executive directors are less informed and are not familiar with firm operations as 
compared to executive directors so this will effect there decision making as a results firm financial performance 
might also negatively affected. However, other researchers did not found any significant effects of non-executive 
directors on firm financial performance like Duchin et al., (2010). 
H2: There is a positive statistically significant effects of non-executive directors on corporate financial 
performance 
2.2.3: CEO Duality and Corporate Financial Performance  
The influence of CEO duality on firm financial performance is still a controversial issue in finance literatures for 
years now. CEO is the chief executive officer of the firm and his the key person in management team for the 
managerial responsibilities while the chairman is the key person in board of directors for the overall supervision 
responsibilities. Several researchers contributed a positive link between CEO duality and firm financial 
performance like Guillet et al., (2013) on their study for restaurant sector, the possible reason to support this 
positive link is due to the argument that, CEO duality decreases communication conflicts and hence creates a 
clear sense of centralized decision making. On the other hand, other researchers contributed a negative link 
between the two variables, CEO duality and firm financial performance like Chen et al., (2005) and the possible 
reason is due to the fact that, the board of directors will be less effective in executing their functions because in 
real life situation boards chairs are the ones who influence setting of board agendas than the rest members of the 
board, hence if CEO is also the chair of the board then the overall board of directors discussions will base on the 
agendas of his own interest .Furthermore, other researchers did not found any significant effects of CEO duality 
on firm financial performance like Amaral-Bapaista et al., (2011). 
H3: There is a positive statistically significant effects of CEO duality on corporate financial performance 
2.2.4: Board and Managerial shareholding and Corporate Financial Performance 
The extent to whether board and managerial shareholding (insider ownership) influence firm financial 
performance is still a hot topic attracting scholars and academicians concern. Several prior researches provided a 
positive influence of board and managerial shareholding on firm financial performance like Park and Jang (2010) 
and the possible reason for this situation is due to the fact that, when insiders (Board members and managers) 
owns shares they will be part of owners and these will automatically boost their performance. On the other hand, 
other studies found a significant negative relationship between board and managerial shareholding and corporate 
financial performance like McConnell and Servaes (1990), the possible reason for this due to the fact when 
insiders (board and managers) are holding a large portion of firm ownership it implied that outsiders (For 
example institutions ) are holding a small portion of firm ownership then after firm monitoring will not be easy 
implemented and management will not work for the best interest of shareholders and therefore firm financial 
performance will also be adverse affected. However, other researchers found no relationship at all between the 
two variables like Brick et al., (2005), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Loderer and Martin (1997),Seifert et 
al.,(2005),Vafeas and Theadorou (1998) and Cho (1998). 
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H4: There is a positive statistically significant effects of board and managerial shareholding on corporate 
financial performance                            
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Scope, Population and Sample Size 
Our study uses all publicly listed firms on East African stock exchanges during the period of 2006-2013. East 
African region comprises of six {6} countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South 
Sudan. We excluded Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan due to unavailability of data for our study timeframe 
(i.e. 8 years). Therefore, the population for this study will includes only three {3} stock market such as Dar es 
Salaam stock exchange (DSE) in Tanzania, Nairobi securities exchange (NSE) in Kenya and Uganda securities 
exchange (USE) in Uganda. 
The listed companies were then screened from the three {3} stock markets against several factors such 
as {1} All financial institutions, including all banks and insurance companies listed in East African stock 
markets were excluded from the study, due to the fact that, the capital structure of these financial institutions is 
highly regulated by central banks and respective insurance regulatory authorities. Moreover, cash is trading 
assets of bank and hence the levels of cash holding are expected to be significant higher than for firms in other 
sectors (Mwangi et al.,2014) {2} The mining listed companies were also excluded from the study due to their big 
different in capital structure and nature of operations as compared to other listed companies 
( Mwambuli,2015){3}All newly listed firms and delisted firms during the period of this study were also 
excluded so as to remove any anomalies (Mwambuli,2016a){4} The study eliminated some listed East African 
companies due to unavailability of data. Finally our sample size consisted of 30 non-financial listed firms. 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
Our study used secondary data which was extracted from various sources, such as OSIRIS database and 
supplemented with East African stock market websites and firms websites {including annual reports} for the 
whole period of our study 2006-2013. The study also consisted a critical review of academic literatures from 
financial journals, books and articles to form a foundation of the study. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Our study used both descriptive and inferential statistics during data processing. Descriptive statistics of study 
variables were computed for whole timeframe from 2006-2013 (8 years period), then the study measured the 
extent of relationship among variables with correlation analysis and lastly panel multiple regression models were 
employed to identify the most significant and influential independent variables on dependent variable. The panel 
methodology was done by using E-VIEWS 8 and STATA 10 statistical packages and 240 observations applied 
on this panel dataset.  
 
3.4 Corporate Financial Performance and Board Structure Characteristics Variables Measurement (Proxy) 
and References 
The study uses two {2} dependent variables, four {4} independent variables and one {1} control variable to 
analyzing the effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance for East African stock 
market listed firms. The study used book values for all of these variables in calculations because our study is 
based on firms annual reports (i.e. financial statements) (See also Khan et al., 2014; Mwambuli, 2016a). 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Our paper uses two {2} dependent variables as measures of corporate financial performance such as Return on 
assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).The study uses these two {2} common accounting measure of 
financial performance because of several reasons: {1}East African stock markets as among of developing 
economies their capital markets are relatively under developed and are not active this make accounting measures 
of financial performance as good as  appropriate to measure firm’s performance as compared to market measures 
of financial performance (Mwambuli,2016a) {2} To make our results significant and comparable with prior 
studies, because these accounting measures of financial performance were mostly employed in previous 
empirical studies (Mwambuli,2016a).The measurements of dependent variables and their respective references 
are shown here below 
Return on Assets(ROA)=Net Profit?Total Assets 
(Mwambuli, 2016a, Alam et al., (2014), Pouraghajan et al., (2012) and Zeitun and Tian (2007)) 
Return on Equity (ROE)=Net Profit?Total Equity 
(Mwambuli, 2016a, Chang et al., (2014), Soumadi and Hayajneh (2012) and Onaolapo and Kajoka (2010)) 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
Our study used four (4) independent variables such as board size (BS), number of non-executive directors (NED), 
CEO duality (CD) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) as measures of board structure 
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characteristics .This study used these variables because prior literatures suggests these four (4) items as the core 
items for board structure characteristics but also in order to make our results comparable with prior empirical 
results conducted on board structure characteristics arena. The measurements of independent variables and their 
respective references are shown here below. 
BS= Total number of board members 
(See Chitiavi et al., (2013) 
NED= is the number of non-executive directors divided by total number of directors. 
(See Ahmadpour et al., (2012) 
CD= is a dummy variable, it is taken as 1 if CEO is chairman; otherwise it is taken as 0.  
(See Agyei and Owusu (2014) 
BMS= Is measured as number of shares held by CEO, directors and their family and child divided by total 
number of shares. 
(See Rahman et al., (2010) 
3.4.3 Control Variable 
Our study used firm size (SIZ) as a control variable in order to control the differences in firm’s operating 
environment. The reason behind this choose of a control variable is due to the fact that prior literatures suggested 
that firm size is likely to influence its financial performance, hence larger firms have a greater variety of 
capabilities and can enjoy economies of scale which may affect the results and inferences (See Ramaswamy 
(2001), Frank and Goyal (2003), Jermias (2008); Ebaid (2009)). 
Firm Size (SIZ) =Natural logarithm of total assets 
(Mwambuli (2016a), Smith et al., (2012), Dewalheyns and Van Hule (2012) and Ebaid (2009)) 
 
3.5 Model Specification 
This study tested the effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance of firms listed 
in East African stock markets by the following regression models. 
Model 1-Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROAit =β0+β1BSit+β2NEDit+β3CDit+β4BMSit+β5SIZit+εit 
Model 2-Return on Equity (ROE) 
ROEit =β0+β1BSit+β2NEDit+β3CDit+β4BMSit+β5SIZit+εit 
Where: 
ROAit= Return on assets of firm i at time t 
ROEit= Return on equity of firm i at time t 
BSit= Board size of firm i at time t 
NEDit= Number of non-executive directors of firm divided by total number of directors of firm i at time t 
CDit= CEO duality of firm i at time t 
BMSit= Board managerial shareholding of firm i at time t 
SIZit= Size of firm i at time t 
β0=Intercept coefficient 
Β1-β5=Coefficients of the concerned independent variables and control variable 
εit =Error term of firm i at time t 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive measures of variables used in this study were presented on Table No 1 below. The results showed 
that ROA and ROE had a mean of 10.37% and 28.93% respectively, these values presents poor financial 
performance for listed firms in East African stock markets during 2006-2013.The average number of board 
members in East African listed firms is 9 directors while the minimum number of board members is 4 directors 
and the maximum number of board members is 12 directors. The average proportion of non-executive directors 
is 66.09% of the total number of board of directors, which shows that many board of directors of listed firms in 
East African stock markets are independent because the average proportion of non-executive directors is higher 
compared to executive directors during the period of study. The average value for CEO Duality stand at 0.15 and 
this show that 15% of listed firms in East African stock markets are having the same person who is holding both 
positions as firm CEO and also chairman of the board of directors whereas 85% of listed firms in East African 
stock markets had independent CEO. On the average the board managerial shareholding is approximately 3.90%, 
which suggest that the large portion of firm ownership for listed firms in East African region is on the hand of 
outsiders with an approximately shareholding of 96.10%.The firm’s size of listed firms in East African region 
had a mean of 22.44, this result suggest that size of the firm is key firm-specific driver of firm performance and 
East African firms are large firms in average as measured in terms of total assets.. 
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Table No 1: The Descriptive Statistics 
 ROA ROE BS NED    CD BMS SIZ 
 Mean 0.103724 0.289298 8.966667 0.660931 0.154167 3.903600 22.44209 
 Median 0.073330 0.166420 9.000000 0.714286 0.000000 0.025400 22.44028 
 Maximum 0.450609 23.88259 20.00000 1.000000 1.000000 66.15000 25.93936 
 Minimum -0.960864 -2.330425 4.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 15.43107 
 Std. Dev. 0.131173 1.560710 3.162101 0.223048 0.361863 9.144252 1.453908 
 Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
Source: E-Views 8 Analysis of Data 
 
4.2 Preliminary Analysis 
4.2.1 Testing for Multicollinearity (Correlation Analysis) 
The correlation coefficients between independent variables used in our study were presented below on Table No 
2.The results present the lowest correlation coefficient of +0.04 between number of non-executive directors and 
board and managerial shareholding while the highest correlation coefficient of +0.55 between board size and 
firm size, therefore this results suggest absence of multicollinearity problem between our independent variables 
because multicollinearity problem arises when the correlation coefficient between independent variables is +/- 
0.80 or higher (Lewis-Beck, 1993, Hossain. I and Hossain. A, 2015; Mwambuli, 2015, Mwambuli, 2016a). 
Table No 2: The Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 SIZ BS NED CD BMS 
SIZ 1.000000 0.554819 0.049183 -0.239699 -0.255877 
BS 0.554819 1.000000 -0.173958 -0.229515 -0.134923 
NED 0.462456 0.500846 1.000000 -0.142012 -0.089497 
CD -0.239699 -0.229515  0.049251 1.000000 0.045074 
BMS -0.255877 -0.134923  0.038949 0.045074 1.000000 
Source: E-Views 8 Analysis of Data 
4.2.2 Unit Root Test 
The econometric model will produce non-sensible or spurious regression results relating to relationship between 
dependent and independent variables if non-stationary data were used. Non-stationary data is when a data series 
does not have a constant mean, variance and auto-covariance at various lags over time (Gujarati, 2007, Hossain. 
I and Hossain. A, 2015, Mwambuli, 2015, Mwambuli, 2016a). 
We run unit root test as proposed by Levin-Lin- Chu (LLC) because our dataset is strongly balanced panel 
dataset. The following hypothesis was considered for this test. 
Null hypothesis (Ho): Panel data contains unit root [non-stationary]. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Panel data is stationary. 
Table 3 below presents the results of LLC test. The results suggest that our variables were stationary at both 
individual intercept and individual intercept and trend. We run this unit root test and p-value is significant at 5% 
significance level, therefore our study rejected our null hypothesis and we accepted our alternative hypothesis 
that our strongly panel dataset were stationary. 
Table No 3: The Unit Root Test results-Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test  
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
         (With individual intercept)         (With individual intercept and trend) 
Variable t-statistic Probability Process t-statistics Probability Process 
ROA -3.75813 0.0001 Stationary -16.0440 0.0000 Stationary 
ROE -7.5493 0.0000 Stationary -15.9945 0.0000 Stationary 
BS -5.18393 0.0000 Stationary -5.78166 0.0000 Stationary 
NED -6.18010 0.0000 Stationary -6.21554 0.0000 Stationary 
CD -1.50082 0.0067 Stationary -2.54901 0.0015 Stationary 
BMS -3.95968 0.0314 Stationary -4.22984 0.0091 Stationary 
SIZ -9.91547 0.0000 Stationary -14.5134 0.0000 Stationary 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
4.2.3 Hausman Test Fixed Effects versus Random Effects Model 
Our study used strongly panel dataset, for this case there is a possibility of having cross sectional effects on firms 
or group of firms. Therefore, we undertake the Hausman test to choose between fixed effects model versus 
random effects model which one will be appropriate for this study. The following hypothesis will be applied for 
our econometric models {i.e. Model 1-ROA and Model 2-ROE}.  
Null hypothesis (Ho): Random effects model is appropriate. 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Random effects model is not appropriate. 
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For {Model 1-ROA}-See Table No 4 below, the Hausman test statistics presents significant p value (0.0188) at 
5% significance level and indicates the fixed effects model is more efficient and should be used in our 
econometric model in order to make sure that results are consistent  
Table No 4: The Hausman test results-Model 1 (ROA) 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ROA   
Test cross-section random effects  
 Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Model 1 Cross-section random 13.543722 5 0.0188 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
For{Model 2-ROE}-See Table No 5 below, the Hausman test statistics presents insignificant p value 
(0.7935) at 5% significance level and indicates the random effects model is more efficient and should be used in 
our econometric model in order to make our results consistent.  
 
Table No 5: The Hausman test results-Model 2 (ROE) 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: ROE   
Test cross-section random effects  
 Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Model 2 Cross-section random 2.386497 5 0.7935 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
4.2.4 Heteroskedasticity Test 
We use Breusch –Pagan-Godfrey test to check for the presence of heteroskedasticity in our econometric models. 
This test is appropriate because the presence of heteroskedasticity in our dataset will lead to inaccurate values of 
t-test and F-test hence our results will be misleading. Heteroskedasticity arise when errors do not have constant 
variance, Gujarati (2007). The following hypothesis will be applied for our econometric models {i.e. Model 1-
ROA and Model 2-ROE}.  
Null hypothesis (Ho): Absence of heteroskedasticity 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Presence of heteroskedasticity 
For {Model 1-ROA}-See Table No 6 below, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistics presents insignificant p 
value (0.3076) at 5% significance level and indicates the model is not facing heteroskedasticity problem 
(absence of heteroskedasticity). 
Table No 6: Heteroskedasticity test results-Model 1 (ROA) 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  
 Model 1 
F-statistic 1.197132 
Prob. F(5,234) 0.3113 
Obs*R-squared 5.986018 
Prob.Chi-Square (5) 0.3076 
Scaled explained SS 51.62585 
Prob.Chi-Square (5) 0.0000 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
For {Model 2-ROE}-See Table No 7 below, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistics presents 
insignificant p value (0.2925) at 5% significance level and indicates the model is not facing heteroskedasticity 
problem (absence of heteroskedasticity). 
Table No 7: Heteroskedasticity test results-Model 2 (ROE) 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  
 Model 2 
F-statistic 1.229410 
Prob. F(5,234) 0.2960 
Obs*R-squared 6.143286 
Prob.Chi-Square (5) 0.2925 
Scaled explained SS 608.0106 
Prob.Chi-Square (5) 0.0000 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
4.2.5 Test for Autocorrelations 
Our study used Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test to check for autocorrelation in the models, the reason 
behind this test is due to the fact that, our study used strongly balanced panel dataset hence the possibility of 
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having autocorrelation cannot be ignored . Autocorrelation {Serial correlation} arises when errors associated to a 
given time period carry over into future time periods, hence presence of autocorrelation will lead to misleading 
results in our econometric models. The following hypothesis will be applied for our econometric models {i.e. 
Model 1-ROA and Model 2-ROE}. 
Null hypothesis (Ho): Absence of autocorrelation 
Alternative hypothesis (H1): Presence of autocorrelation 
For {Model 1-ROA}-See Table No 8 below, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test statistics presents 
significant p value (0.0000) at 5% significance level and indicates the model is facing autocorrelation problem 
(presence of autocorrelation). 
Table No 8: Autocorrelation test results-Model 1 (ROA) 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
 Model 1 
F-statistic 52.39210 
Prob. F(2,232) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 74.67158 
Prob.Chi-Square (2) 0.0000 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
For {Model 2-ROE}-See Table No 9 below, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test statistics 
presents insignificant p value (0.7834) at 5% significance level and indicates the model is not facing 
autocorrelation problem (absence of autocorrelation). 
Table No 9: Autocorrelation test results-Model 2 (ROE) 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
 Model 2 
F-statistic 0.236399 
Prob. F(2,232) 0.7897 
Obs*R-squared 0.488106 
Prob.Chi-Square (2) 0.7834 
Source: E-VIEWS 8 Analysis of Data 
4.2.6 Panels Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) and Random/Fixed Effects Regression Models  
We used Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) model for model 1 (ROA) instead of fixed effects model as 
proposed by Hausman test (See Table No 4 above) because model 1 (ROA) is facing autocorrelation problem, 
Therefore the PCSEs model will correct the problem automatically and hence the model 1 (ROA) will present 
reliable best estimates for all variables. For model 2 (ROE),we used random effects model as proposed by 
Hausman test (See Table No 5 above) because this model is free from heteroskedasticity problem with or 
without autocorrelation problem. According to Kmeta (1997), Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) as an 
alternative to the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) for fitting the panel data models when the errors are 
not independent and identically distributed; rather the errors are either heteroskedastic across panels or 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels, with or without autocorrelation (Hossain. I and 
Hossain. A, 2015, Mwambuli, 2016a). 
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4.3 Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 Model 1-Return on Asset (R0A) 
Table No 10: Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) model results-Model 1 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2823517   .0680925     4.15   0.000      .148893    .4158105
         siz    -.0127914   .0038477    -3.32   0.001    -.0203328   -.0052501
         bms    -.0033992   .0011291    -3.01   0.003    -.0056122   -.0011862
          cd     .0247094   .0147823     1.67   0.095    -.0042634    .0536822
         ned     .0762416   .0211987     3.60   0.000     .0346929    .1177904
          bs     .0075288   .0022771     3.31   0.001     .0030659    .0119918
                                                                              
         roa        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         6          Prob > chi2        =    0.0005
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(5)       =     22.25
Estimated covariances      =       465          R-squared          =    0.0825
                                                               max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =         8
Panels:           correlated (balanced)         Obs per group: min =         8
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   code                          Number of obs      =       240
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
Source: STATA 10 Analysis of Data 
4.3.2 Model 2-Return on Equity (R0E) 
Table No 11: Random Effects (RE) model results-Model 2 
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.5848409
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -.5663926   1.808936    -0.31   0.754    -4.111842    2.979056
         siz     .0249662   .0880941     0.28   0.777    -.1476951    .1976274
         bms      -.00234   .0114573    -0.20   0.838    -.0247959    .0201159
          cd     .5840306   .2900669     2.01   0.044       .01551    1.152551
         ned     .1856496   .4687868     0.40   0.692    -.7331556    1.104455
          bs     .0102371   .0398462     0.26   0.797    -.0678601    .0883343
                                                                              
         roe        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.5018
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(5)       =      4.34
       overall = 0.0182                                        max =         8
       between = 0.1840                                        avg =       8.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0000                         Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: code                            Number of groups   =        30
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       240
Source: STATA 10 Analysis of Data 
4.3.4 Discussion of regression results for Model 1- (ROA) and Model 2- (ROE) 
Table No 10 above presents the results from the panel regression (Panel Corrected Standard Errors - PCSEs) for 
Model 1-(ROA).The results indicate that board structure characteristics such as board size (BS), number of non-
executive directors (NED) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) has a statistically significant effects on 
corporate financial performance as measured by ROA at 5% significance level. The coefficients of board size 
(BS), number of non-executive directors (NED) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) were 
+0.0075288, +0.0762416 and -0.0033992 respectively and the p values were 0.001, 0.000 and 0.003 respectively. 
It shows that the board size (BS) has a statistically significant positive effects on ROA, hence the firm with large 
board of directors are profitable as measured by ROA, the possible reason to support this results is due to the fact 
that, larger boards have a diverse range of expertise to assists making better firm decisions but also its easy for 
large board to monitor the powerful CEO and his management team. Our results also indicates a statistically 
significant positive effects of number of non-executive directors on ROA, this implied that profitable firms in 
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East African region are the ones with large proportion of non-executive directors on their board, possible reason 
is the fact that, existence of non-executive directors in the board will be an effective monitoring of management 
team functions. However, for board and managerial shareholding (BMS),the results report a statistically 
significant negative effects on ROA, hence the firm with  small percentage of insiders ownership are profitable 
as measured by ROA, the possible reason for this due to the fact when insiders (board and managers) are holding 
the large portion of firm ownership it implied that outsiders (For example institutions ) are holding a small 
portion of firm ownership then after firm monitoring will not be easy implemented and management will not 
work for the best interest of shareholders and therefore firm financial performance will also be adverse 
affected .Furthermore the results indicates statistically insignificant effects between CEO duality (CD) with 
corporate financial performance as measured by ROA at 5% significance level. The coefficients of CEO duality 
(CD) was + 0.0247094 and the p value was 0.095. The results also indicate a statistically significant effects of 
firm size (i.e. control variable) on corporate financial performance as measured by ROA with p values of 0.001 
at 5% significance level. Table No 10 above also reported the prob>chi2 of 0.0005 at 5% significance level, 
suggesting that our model (Model 1-ROA) is statistically significant. 
The effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance as measured by ROE 
were presented by Table No 11 above as per random effects regression model. The results indicates only CEO 
duality (CD) as a measure of board structure characteristics has a statistically significant effects on corporate 
financial performance as measured by ROE at 5% significance level. The coefficient of CEO duality (CD) was 
+0.5840306 and the p value was 0.044. It shows that the CEO duality (CD) has a statistically significant positive 
effects on ROE, hence the firm with the combination of the CEO-Chair positions are profitable as measured by 
ROE, and the possible reason to support this results is due to the argument that, CEO duality decreases 
communication conflicts and hence creates a clear sense of centralized decision making. However, the results 
indicates statistically insignificant effects between other board structure characteristics such as board size (BS), 
number of non-executive directors (NED) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) with corporate 
financial performance as measured by ROE at 5% significance level. The coefficients of number of board size 
(BS), non-executive directors (NED) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) were +0.0102371, 
+0.1856496 and -0.00234 and the p values were 0.797, 0.692 and 0.838 respectively. The results also indicate a 
statistically insignificant effects of firm size (i.e. control variable) on corporate financial performance as 
measured by ROE with p values of 0.777 at 5% significance level. Table No 11 above also reported the 
prob>chi2 of 0.5018 at 5% significance level, suggesting that our model (Model 2-ROE) is statistically 
insignificant. 
In Summary, the results shown on Table No 10 and Table No 11 indicates the effects of board structure 
characteristics on East African listed firm’s financial performance at 5% significance level. The results indicate a 
statistically significant positive effects of board size (BS) on corporate financial performance, which suggest that 
an increase in number of board directors will result to an increase in corporate financial performance {ROA}, 
our results are consistent with previous empirical results reported by Wen et al., (2002) and Abor (2007), hence 
we accepted the hypothesis H1. Number of non-executive directors (NED) has also statistically significant 
positive effects on corporate financial performance, implied that an increase in number of non-executive 
directors in the board will lead to an increase in firm financial performance (ROA ), our results are consistent 
with empirical results reported by Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) and Arosa et al., (2010), hence we accepted the 
hypothesis H2.However the results indicates a statistically significant positive effects of CEO duality (CD) on 
corporate financial performance, which suggest that a firm with CEO-Chair position will result to an increase in 
corporate financial performance {ROE}, our results are consistent with previous empirical results reported by 
Guillet et al., (2013) ,hence we accepted the hypothesis H3.Board and managerial shareholding (BMS) has a 
statistically significant negative effect on corporate financial performance, which suggest that a firm with small 
portion of insiders shareholding will result to an increase in corporate financial performance {ROA}, our results 
are consistent with previous empirical results reported by McConnell and Servaes (1990) ,hence we rejected the 
hypothesis H4 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Our study investigate the effects of board structure characteristics on corporate financial performance of listed 
non-financial companies in East African stock markets. To our knowledge this is the first study to undertake 
such an analysis for the East African region, therefore this study fill the gap in finance and accounting literatures.  
This study used strongly balanced panel dataset of 240 observations including 30 non-financial listed 
firms in East African region (i.e. Firms listed at Dar es Salaam stock market (DSE), Nairobi securities exchange 
(NSE) and Uganda securities exchange (USE) for a period of 8 years (i.e. 2006-2013). We used return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as dependent variables (measures for corporate financial performance) for 
econometric Model 1 and Model 2 respectively, on the other hand we used board size (BS),number of non-
executive directors (NED),CEO duality (CD) and board and managerial shareholding (BMS) as independent 
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variables (measures for board structure characteristics),furthermore firm size (SIZ) as a control variable in our 
econometric models (i.e. Model 1-ROA and Model 2-ROE) 
We conducted preliminary tests before estimating our econometric models, we found that our dataset 
were free from multicollinearity problem, then we found also all variables were stationary at both individual 
intercept and individual intercept and trend, we then found that our models (Model 1-ROA and Model 2-ROE) 
are not facing heteroskedasticity but Model 1-ROA was facing autocorrelation while Model 2-ROE was not 
facing autocorrelation. Hausman test suggested for fixed effects model and random effects model for Model 1-
ROA and Model 2-ROE respectively but we employed Panel Corrected Standard Errors regression model for 
Model 1-ROA because this model was facing autocorrelation then Panel Corrected Standard Errors regression 
model used so as to correct autocorrelation on the panel dataset. 
Our results indicate a statistically significant positive effects of board size (BS), number of non-
executive directors (NED) and CEO duality (CD) on East African listed firm’s financial performance while 
board and managerial shareholding (BMS) has a statistically significant negative effects on East African listed 
firm’s financial performance at 5% significance level. Although the East African listed firms stills have poor 
corporate governance practices compared to firms in developed economies, this empirical findings suggest that 
board structure characteristics playing an important role in deciding the corporate financial performance for East 
African listed firms 
The study recommends East African listed firm’s to adopt a larger size of board of directors, large 
proportion on non-executive directors on their board , CEO-Chair position in their organization structure and a 
small portion of board and managerial shareholding on their ownership structure in order to improve their 
financial performance, but also Securities markets regulatory authorities in East African region such as East 
African member states securities regulatory authority (EASRA) and their respective countries securities markets 
regulatory authorities to stimulates new efforts towards better corporate governance practices especially board 
structure characteristics due to its statistically significant effects on companies financial performance, 
furthermore future research can be extended after considering other board structure characteristics which were 
not included in this study like board meeting, board attendance, biography of board members and existence of 
the position of chief financial officer (CFO) in board of directors . 
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